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This work project studies the effect of variations in the proportion of female candidates 
on the quality of politicians. This effect was divided between nominated and elected 
body. Cross-sectional data was used for two elections, and an OLS as an IV approach. 
Results show that the existence of female candidates on parties’ list increases the 
quality of the nominated body. Moreover, contrary to what many advocate, increasing 
the presence of female candidates either increases or has no effect on the quality of the 
elected body. Results that were confirmed for the overall data and controlling for 
region factors only. 
Keywords: Women’s representation; Quality; City council elections; Brazil 
I. Introduction 
The growing pressure to increase women’s representation in the political arena, has 
led almost 100 countries to introduce gender quotas in their political systems, in the last 
two decades (Dahlerup, 2007). Specifically, between 1997 and 2007 the number of 
countries introducing gender quotas increased from 10 to 49. And, although the share of 
female elected politicians is below 50 percent in most countries, countries that 
introduced gender quotas present shares about 5 percentage points higher than no-quota 
countries (Júlio and Tavares, 2010). The adoption of gender quotas has been sustained 
by many, arguing that; it is an essential tool to achieve gender equality, which is of 
major important for democratic evolution (Jones, 2008; Dahlerup, 2007). Others suggest 
that quotas work as a mechanism that will change the male-dominated legislatures, 
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through the increase in competition between genders, which will break through cultural 
and social influences (Tripp and Kang, 2008; Dahlerup, 2007). Moreover, many believe 
that women’s access into politics is constrained by voter and party bias, namely due to 
limited contact with female politicians in the past. This highlights the advantages of 
gender quotas as a way to improve the voter’s perception of the quality of female 
politicians, which may contribute to a reduction of gender bias in politics (Beaman et al, 
2009; Maniquet et al, 2005). And finally, this policy may bring into the decision-making 
process an adequate set of policies that women are more likely to propose, such as 
education and health laws (Saint-Germain, 1989).  
Those against, see it as a violation of the merit principle (Dahlerup, 2007); a 
mechanism that is perceived to reduce the value of a traditional male activity (Goldin, 
1990), and that it also restricts voters’ choice (Thernstrom and Thernstrom, 1997). In 
addition, one of the main discussions revolves around the idea that the introduction of 
gender quotas may induce a potential sacrifice on the quality of the political body. The 
basic intuition behind this is that female under-representation is explained by individual 
choices. Therefore, the quota is a restriction that is imposed in the electoral system to 
the benefit of women, changing the initial political equilibrium, in a way independent of 
merit, and may generate an efficiency loss (Holzer and Neumark, 2000). 
In Brazil, gender quotas for municipality elections were introduced in 1995. And, 
although women outweigh men in all levels of education, in average life expectancy and 
in participation in the workforce, the percentage of female candidates and of females 
elected in Federal, State and Municipal Elections has been below the established 
threshold, 30 percent (Alves, 2010). These gender disparities in politics and society, 
together with the aforementioned argument that gender quotas have a negative impact 
on the quality of politicians, calls for further investigation. 
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Existing literature has mainly focused on the impact of gender quotas on women 
representation (see Krook, 2006); however the relationship between the increase of 
women candidates and the quality of the elected body, outside the gender quotas 
context, has not been tested. Therefore, the purpose of this work is to assess: i) the 
effect of having women candidates, on the quality composition of parties’ list and ii) the 
impact of gender composition of parties’ list on the quality and gender composition of 
the elected body. It will focus on Brazilian city council elections, occurred in 2000 and 
2004. Both elections occurred under the same quota legislation. 
The dimension of Brazil, composed by 5562 municipalities, with a wide range of 
sizes
1
, the heterogeneity across municipalities, regarding cultural and socio-economic 
differences, and quite different results in terms of the gender and the quality of 
candidates and elected body, provided enough variance to give consistency to the study. 
Moreover, the type of party list employed for city council elections is the open list 
system, in which voters can choose whoever they want from the list. This system 
creates an interesting dynamics to the study of the allocation of candidates on parties’ 
list.  
To analyze the effects of women candidates on the quality of nominated politicians, 
an OLS approach was used. As for the effects of women candidates on the gender and 
on the quality of elected politicians, both an OLS approach as an IV - correcting for 
endogeneity - were utilized. Quality of politicians was measure by the type (high-skill 
or not)
2
 of their former occupation. Given the assumption that there is a positive 
correlation between market skills and political skills (Galasso and Nannici, 2010; 
Casselli and Morelli, 2001; Mattozzi and Merlo, 2007; Baltrunaite et al, 2012).  Results 
show that, women candidates are increasing, due to the increase in high and low-skill 
                                                            
1  São Paulo is the biggest municipality with 11 376 685 inhabitants in 2012, and Borá with 807 inhabitants, is the 
smallest (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatísticas, 2012). 
2  The complete list of occupations included in this category can be found in Appendix A. 
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female candidates. Moreover, the effect of the presence of female candidates on the 
quality of the overall nominated politicians is positive, due to the increase in high-skill 
female candidates and the reduction on low-skill male candidates. Moving to the impact 
on the elected body, contrary to the argument that gender quotas imposes a cost on the 
quality of the elected body, increases in female candidates, actually increased the 
overall quality of the elected body in the OLS estimation, effect that is mostly driven 
not only by the increase in the proportion of high-skill females elected, but also by the 
reduction on the proportion of low-skill males elected. However, there is no effect on 
the overall quality of the elected body when the IV estimation is computed. Results that 
were confirmed when controlling for regional factors only, and for a series of municipal 
indicators. 
In Brazil, since women outweigh men in all educational levels, the existing gender 
gaps in politics may represent a cost for both society and politics, because there is an 
unexploited potential role for women. Therefore, affirmative action programs that aim 
to increase women representation in politics may represent an effective mechanism that 
brings into the political arena more educated politicians. Hence, as long as it is expected 
that high-skill individuals perform better as politicians, increasing female 
representativeness may be beneficial for the society. Also, the increased contact with 
female politicians, provided by gender quotas, may also reduce voter’ and party’ bias 
and increase their ability to distinguish between good and bad female politicians. Which 
may ultimately, facilitate women’ access into politics, challenging new women to get 
involved in politics, contributing to democratic development.         
This work is organized as follows: section II discusses the related literature; section 
III describes Brazilian city council elections and its electoral system; section IV presents 
the data, the empirical strategy and the empirical results and section V concludes. 
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II. Related Literature 
This work compiles and integrates two strands of the literature already published; the 
introduction of gender quotas and the quality and selection of politicians. 
1. Introduction of gender quotas 
Most of the existing literature has been focused on the impact of gender quotas on 
women representation (see Krook, 2006). Some have emphasized, that this impact 
depends on the electoral system (Norris, 1985; Kenworthy and Malami, 1999). In 
Brazil, the proportional representation system is used in city council elections. This 
system is considered by many authors, to be the most effective in promoting women 
representation. It is argued that in such a system, district magnitude tends to be greater, 
therefore as the number of seats increases, so does the chances of a party winning 
several seats in a district, facilitating women’s access into politics. Bigger districts tend 
to be more heterogeneous, this may lead parties to consider a variety of interests, 
including the representation of women in their lists (Ballington and Matland, 2004; 
Matland and Studal, 1996; Tripp and Kang, 2008; Jones, 1998; Maniquet et al, 2005). 
The open list form is used in Brazilian city council elections. In this form, contrarily to 
the close list form, in which, the quota legislation, stipulates that from the winning 
seats, some of them will have to be allocated to women; in the open-list there is no such 
guarantee. Also, since there is no law regulating the party’s list construction, if 
discrimination against women occurs in the intraparty selection process, the 
disadvantage to women representation in the open-list system may be even bigger 
(Jones, 1998). Nonetheless, such disadvantage may be overcome, by a proper design of 
the quota legislation like the “zipper quota” where men and women candidates need to 
be alternated in list positions (Freidenvall, 2003).   
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Besides, most forms of quota regimes, by changing the common de facto situation, of 
a traditional male activity, where men only compete with men, provide an equal 
opportunity, for both genders to compete for political positions, enabling voters to 
choose between male and female candidates (Dahlerup, 2007). Also, by bringing 
women into politics, quota regimes may affect gender stereotypes and the perception of 
the effectiveness of female leadership (Beaman et al, 2009).   
2. Quality and selection of politicians 
Potential candidates differ in terms of their quality and gender, creating a trade-off in 
the selection of candidates, especially in the Brazilian electoral system, in which party 
ballot composition becomes of crucial importance for the party’s success. Higher 
quality is a threat to the party’s leadership, since any leader is more likely to be 
challenged internally by more able candidates. For the same reasoning, male politicians 
have a bias against female politicians (Besley, 2012)
3
. This is also explained, due to 
their differences in policy preferences (Saint-Germain, 1989; Thomas, 1984).    
Regarding the quality factor it is supported that low quality citizens have a 
comparative advantage in holding office then in the private sector (Caselli and Morelli, 
2001; Júlio and Tavares, 2010; Messner and Polborn, 2003). Thus, the existence of 
gender quotas will attract women that have a lower opportunity cost on the private 
sector to run as candidates, reducing the average quality of the elected body (Caselli and 
Morelli, 2001). However, this negative impact on the average quality of politicians is 
also influenced by the rewards from public office and the level of political 
discrimination that women face in the political arena. Therefore, if rewards from public 
office are low comparing to those in the private sector, low quality citizens, have indeed 
a comparative advantage in holding office, decreasing the overall quality. Also, if the 
                                                            
3  Besley et al (2012) studied the choice of political parties’ list composition regarding gender and competence, under 
proportional representation system, which is the electoral system, used in Brazilian city council elections. 
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rewards are high but women face a significant discrimination in the political market, the 
overall quality of the elected body decreases (Júlio and Tavares, 2010). The selection of 
candidates will also determine the quality of the pool of politicians; therefore focus has 
been put on the parties’ recruitment decisions. The parties’ decisions on the new recruit 
may be closely affected by decisions in other sectors, as already mentioned. For 
instance, given the close relationship between the lobbying sector and the political 
sector, in which parties have better information about the new recruits than the lobbying 
sector, the latter can only infer about the individuals’ political skills based on party’s 
recruitment decisions. Therefore, a political party facing competition for political talent 
from lobbying firms, may intentionally decide to recruit only mediocre individuals, 
because politicians with relative higher skills makes party recruits more expensive 
(Matozzi and Merlo, 2007)
 4
. 
Regarding the gender factor, there may also be an incentive for male incumbents to 
support a parity law, as a strategy to increase their likelihood of being elected. Under a 
single member district electoral system, if a parity law is approved, the number of new 
female candidates’ increases and it also becomes more likely for a male incumbent to 
face a woman challenger. Moreover, due to the existence of voter’ bias in favour of 
male candidates and because women are perceived to have, on average, a lower 
electoral support, these will weaken the pool of challengers and increase the 
incumbency male advantage. This mechanism is likely to emerge even when women’s 
quality is high, due to voter’ and political’ bias against women (Manique et al, 2005)
5
. 
                                                            
4 Matozzi and Merlo (2007) studied the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector, through an 
equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who faces political competition for political talent from the 
lobbying sector. The closed relationship between the two sectors, as they say, in the recruitment decisions is 
explained by the fact that lobbyists have to deal with politicians, therefore political skills are valued by the lobbying 
sector, and the wages is this sector will affect the recruitment decisions of a political party. Also, to deal with skilled 
politicians requires skilled lobbyists, thus the party’s recruitment decisions affect the output of the lobbying sector, 
and therefore the wages in the political sector. 
5 They studied the incentives behind the approval of the parity law with fees and the relation between the electoral 
rules and the low number of women elected in 1997 and 2002 French National Assembly elections. Fréchette et al 
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Although Carmo (2012) found that in Brazilian city council elections, under a 
proportional representation system, the presence of female candidates is a win-win 
situation. Men’s electoral success can be optimized by having until 22.5 percent of 
females on the list. Women’s electoral success increases until approximately 75 percent 
of the list are women. And party’s electoral results are maximized by having 37,3 
percent
6
 of women in the list.  
 Electoral competition also plays a role in determining the selection of politicians. 
Regarding the quality of politicians, electoral competition has beneficial effects, since 
politicians with higher quality are more likely to run in contestable districts (Galasso 
and Nannicini, 2010)
7
. Regarding the politicians’ gender, as competition increases, so 
does the quality of the party leaders. This makes them less constrained on the selection 
of their followers, leading to a political body more able and diverse (Besley, 2012). 
Finally, as Baltrunaite et al (2012)
8
 empirically showed, gender quotas, by increasing 
the number of elected women, who are on average more educated than men, and by 
decreasing the number of low-educated men, may contribute to increase the overall 
quality of politicians. Furthermore, gender quotas can push party leaders to re-think 
about their own preferences and those of the electorate, causing an increase in gender 
diversity and competence (Besley et al, 2012). In what follows the intention is to move 
away from the effects of gender quotas and focus on the effects of increases in women 
representation on the quality of politicians. Specifically on its effects on the quality 
                                                                                                                                                                              
(2007) continued the same studied, for 2002 and 2007 French National Assembly elections, and the effect described 
above persisted (see also Fréchette and Maniquet, 2006).  
6  Percentage that is higher than the one required by quota legislation (30%). 
7 They addressed the impact of electoral competition in the process of political selection, taking into account the 
different degrees of contestability in electoral districts in Italy. Quality was measured by years of schooling, previous 
market income, and local government experience. 
8 They studied the impact of introducing gender quotas on the quality of politicians, considering an Italian law which 
introduced gender quotas in local elections in 1993, and was abolished in 1995. Quality was measured by years of 




composition of parties’ list and the relationship between gender composition of parties’ 
list and the gender and quality composition of the elected body. 
III. Brazilian City Council Elections and Electoral System 
The Brazilian city council elections use the open list type and the proportional 
representation electoral system. The former translates in an unordered list of candidates 
presented to the voters. At the election stage, each voter may decide to vote for an 
individual candidate or for a party.  Then, through the totality of votes for the party and 
for the party’s candidates, seats are allocated between parties, and are given to those 
within a party with the highest number of votes (coalition)
9
. District magnitude varies 
according to population, ranging from 9 to 55 seats. Parties are allowed to present a 
candidate’s list that corresponds to 150% of the seats
10
. The parties’ choice regarding 
their candidates list is defined by each party’s internal bylaws. Though, the candidate 
must be affiliated to a party in the municipality where he is running for at least a year 
(Nicolau, 2007). Gender quota legislation, dated from 1995, requires that at least 30 
percent of the places on the list should be filled by each gender. However, since it was 
established there is nothing that makes it enforceable. 
IV. Data and Methodology 
The empirical strategy follows three steps: first, the percentage of high and low-skill 
candidates is regressed on the percentage of female candidates, and on a set of political, 
regional, cultural and socio-economic controls; second, the gender and the quality 
composition of the elected politicians is regressed on the percentage of female 
candidates (plus the previous controls); and third, an instrumental variable is used to 
account for endogeneity. 
                                                            
9 The Brazilian electoral system rules due to the rules of distribution of seats in coalitions, creates considerable 
disproportionality. Moreover, the way the blank ballot is accounted and the lack of perfect relation between 
proportion of seats and proportion of citizens, further contributes to the high observed disproportionality (Tafner, 
1996; Nicolau and Schmitt, 1995). 
10 200% in a coalition.  
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For this analysis data from 2000 and 2004 Brazilian city council elections were 
utilized as well as data from municipality and party characteristics for those years. The 
notation used assigns an observation to party  in municipality  at time  (138 633 
observations
11
). As controls; district magnitude, religion and socio-economic variables 





; year, region and party’s ideology dummies are included 
to control for these unobservable effects. Taking into account this specification, enables 
the usage of OLS and then IV. A detailed description of the variables’ sources can be 
found in Appendix B. Summary statistics for all the considered variables can be found 
in Appendix C. The baseline OLS estimator is of the form: 
,  
where  is the outcome of interest;  is the percentage of female candidates on 
party list , from municipality , at time ;  are the set of controls in municipality  
at time ; and  is an error term. 
As a proxy for quality, the type (high-skill or not) of the former occupation of the 
candidates was used. Motivated by the assumption of a positive correlation between 
market skills and political skills, a scenario in which one finds a higher share of 
politicians with a previous high-skill occupation, is interpreted as an indicator of a 
higher quality political body (Galasso and Nannici, 2010; Casselli and Morelli, 2001; 
Mattozzi and Merlo, 2007; Baltrunaite et al, 2012). 
District magnitude represents the total number of seats available per district. On one 
hand, there is evidence that a higher number of seats are an advantage for female 
                                                            
11  There are missing values regarding municipality and city council elections characteristics. 
12 Caul (2001) includes elites’ power, women hierarchy in the party, support given to women on campaigns and the 
recruitment process.  
13 Caul (1999) identifies party’s organizational structure; its ideology; the share of women party activists and its 
gender-related representation rules. 
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representation (Jones, 1998; Rule, 1987; Matland and Brown, 1992). On the other hand, 
if campaign costs increase with district magnitude, and given that there is an unequal 
income distribution and lack of public financing for campaign costs in Brazil, women 
are at a disadvantage (Carmo, 2012)
14
. Also, higher district magnitude usually increases 
party delegations
15
 and therefore, the competition among parties, and because women 
are perceived to have a lower electoral support
16
 it may be harmful for women.
17
 
To account for religion, we use the percentage of Catholics and Protestants in the 
municipality, because they are the first and second most important religions respectively 
in Brazil (Census, 2010), and because there is previous evidence that Catholics are less 
prone to female representation (Davidson-Schimit, 2006; Tripp and Kang, 2008; 
Schwindt-Bayer, 2005). 
Concerning socio-economic variables, the following were included; GDP per capita 
(since higher economic status increases female political representation (Reynolds, 1999; 
Tripp and Kang, 2008)); percentage of women in the municipality, (since it can either 
influence the supply of potential female candidates, or the parties’ strategic decision on 
the number of women included on the lists, under the populist idea that women will be 
less averse to vote for candidates that have the same gender as them (Beaman et al, 
2009))
18
. Average schooling per gender was also included, under the hypothesis that 
education and gender affect attitudes towards female representation (Inglehart and 
                                                            
14  The disproportional distribution of income across gender in Brazil is also identified in Araújo and Alves (2007). 
15  This variable is related with district magnitude, but is also affected by other factors such as distribution of the vote 
and rules for allocating seats among the parties (Schmidt, 2003). 
16  Maniquet et al (2005) empirically showed that the existence of voters’ bias against female candidates, will increase 
the incumbency male advantage. 
17 Davidson-Schimit (2006) empirically showed the negative relation between adherence of the party to quota 
legislation and the number of voters per direct mandate, highlighting the idea that women may be negatively affected 
in larger districts. Moreover, Schmidt (2003) exploited the fact that larger districts usually imply larger party 
delegations, which in turn decreases competition within the party for scarce list positions. Moreover, these larger 
party delegations will have a greater influence in the recruitment process. Reinforcing the idea, that larger districts 
that usually contribute to larger parties, will bring changes to the selection of candidates, which may be prejudicial to 
women. 
18 But some authors have not found any significant relationship between women’s position in the social structure and 
their representation in politics. (Sigelman and Welch, 1984; Darcy and Scharmm, 1997; Paxton, 1997). 
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Norris, 2003; Schwindt-Bayer, 2005; Reynolds, 1999)
19
. And finally, health and 
education indicators, firstly because better socio-economic indicators are usually 
associated with higher female representation, as previously discussed. And secondly, 
because women are perceived to be more likely to invest in and promote laws regarding 
health and education (Beaman et al, 2009; Saint-Germain, 1989). 
A. Impact of female candidates on the quality composition of parties’ list 
To start with, it is assumed that parties are not supply constrained for female 
candidates
20
. Therefore the decision concerned with the number of female candidates on 
parties’ list and the choice of the type (high-skill or low-skill) of female candidates is 
not simultaneous. With this it can be plausibly assumed that the percentage of female 
candidates is exogenous. Consequently, the OLS estimator takes the form of: 
 ,  
where  measures the percentage of high-skill female candidates; the percentage 
of low-skill female candidates; the percentage of high-skill male candidates; the 
percentage of low-skill male candidates; the percentage of total high-skill candidates; 
and the percentage of total low-skill candidates, on party list , from municipality , at 
time . The rest of the variables are defined in the same way as before. Here, the goal is 
to assess the effects of increases in female candidates on the quality composition of 
parties’ list, therefore the dependent variables were constructed as the following: 
, the ratio of the type of candidate over 
the total list of party , in municipality , at time  to measure the list composition 
effects. The following regressions were estimated with controls, for the overall data and 
                                                            
19 Inglehart and Norris (2003), found a positive relation between wealthier postindustrial societies and women 
representativeness. 
20 In 2006 municipality council elections it was estimated that for each vacancy for the municipality council there was 
at least 2,5 females available (Alves, 2010). 
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with regional controls only, results for this specification can be found in Table 1C in 
Appendix D. 
TABLE 1 – OLS REGRESSION RESULTS (2)  








Percentage of Female Candidates 0,301*** 0,319*** 0,535*** 0,699*** 0,702*** 0,701*** 
North 0,007*** -0,003 0,006 -0,007*** 0,003 -0,003** 
South -0,001 -0,002 0,000 0,002 0,003 0,001 
Northeast 0,011*** 0,005 0,006* -0,011*** -0,006** -0,010*** 
Southeast -0,002 -0,013*** 0,007** 0,002 0,013*** 0,005*** 
GDPpc 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,000 -0,000 -0,000 
District Magnitude 0,001*** 0,001*** 0,001*** -0,001*** -0,001*** -0,001*** 
Percentage of Women 0,005 0,093 0,017 -0,006 -0,193*** -0,008** 
Average Schooling (F) 0,011*** 0,010 0,018** -0,012*** -0,006 -0,012*** 
Average Schooling (M) -0,007* -0,011 -0,028*** 0,007** 0,006 0,008** 
Percentage of Catholics 0,010* 0,001 0,010 -0,007 0,008 -0,002 
Percentage of Protestants 0,002 -0,031 0,035 -0,000 0,027 0,010 
Student per Teacher -0,000*** -0,000** -0,001*** 0,000*** 0,000 0,000*** 
Infant Mortality pc 2,730** 0,745 4,188 -2,571** -0,906 -1,704 
Vaccine pc 0,000 0,001 -0,003 -0,000 -0,003 -0,001 
Center 0,007*** 0,009*** 0,038*** -0,007*** -0,007*** -0,006*** 
Left 0,012*** 0,012*** 0,023*** -0,012*** -0,011*** -0,011*** 
Right 0,004*** 0,003 0,027*** -0,004*** -0,003 -0,003*** 
Year=2004 - - -0,138*** - - -0,001 
Constant -0,037*** -0,057* 0,058*** 0,040*** 0,106*** 0,033*** 
Number of Observations 80.211 35.184 115.395 79.508 38.338 117.846 
Adjusted R-Squared 0,250 0,265 0,173 0,639 0,646 0,643 








Percentage of Female Candidates -0,142*** -0,182*** -0,289*** -0,855*** -0,822*** -0,841*** 
North 0,028*** 0,007 0,045*** -0,028*** -0,009* -0,022*** 
South -0,010*** -0,032*** -0,011** 0,009*** 0,033*** 0,009*** 
Northeast 0,024*** 0,000 0,043*** -0,025*** 0,000 -0,030*** 
Southeast -0,021*** -0,040*** -0,016*** 0,021*** 0,039*** 0,021*** 
GDPpc 0,001*** 0,001*** 0,001*** -0,001*** -0,001*** -0,001*** 
District Magnitude 0,008*** 0,005*** 0,018*** -0,007*** -0,004*** -0,007*** 
Percentage of Women -0,013* 1,802*** -0,018 0,012* -1,873*** -0,004 
Average Schooling (F) 0,009 -0,034** 0,003 -0,008 0,033** -0,004 
Average Schooling (M) 0,023*** 0,057*** 0,064*** -0,022*** -0,056*** -0,031*** 
Percentage of Catholics -0,025** -0,025 -0,046** 0,024** 0,041** 0,032*** 
Percentage of Protestants -0,087*** -0,052 -0,094*** 0,083*** 0,062* 0,086*** 
Student per Teacher 0,000*** 0,000 0,002*** -0,000*** -0,000 -0,001*** 
Infant Mortality pc 5,241** -15,541*** 16,092*** -3,926* 16,774*** 2,331 
Vaccine pc -0,001 0,009* -0,010*** 0,001 -0,009* -0,002 
Center 0,018*** 0,012*** 0,083*** -0,018*** -0,010*** -0,013*** 
Left 0,043*** 0,034*** 0,073*** -0,042*** -0,033*** -0,037*** 
Right 0,009*** 0,002 0,055*** -0,009*** -0,001 -0,004* 
Year=2004 - - -0,246*** - - -0,033*** 
Constant -0,009 -0,781*** 0,059** 1,006*** 1,807*** 1,014*** 
Number of Observations 80.437 37.539 117.976 80.437 38.338 118.775 
Adjusted R-Squared 0,070 0,064 0,169 0,463 0,456 0,461 








Percentage of Female Candidates 0,159*** 0,121*** 0,143*** -0,159*** -0,121*** -0,143*** 
North 0,034*** 0,005 0,024*** -0,034*** -0,005 -0,024*** 
South -0,014*** -0,035*** -0,012*** 0,014*** 0,035*** 0,012*** 
Northeast 0,033*** 0,005 0,038*** -0,033*** -0,006 -0,038*** 
Southeast -0,024*** -0,052*** -0,026*** 0,024*** 0,052*** 0,026*** 
GDPpc 0,001*** 0,001*** 0,001*** -0,001*** -0,001*** -0,001*** 
District Magnitude 0,009*** 0,006*** 0,009*** -0,009*** -0,006*** -0,009*** 
Percentage of Women -0,014* 2,006*** 0,007 0,014* -2,006*** -0,007 
Average Schooling (F) 0,017** -0,028* 0,013* -0,017** 0,028* -0,013* 
Average Schooling (M) 0,018** 0,051*** 0,025*** -0,018** -0,051*** -0,025*** 
Percentage of Catholics -0,016 -0,038 -0,028** 0,016 0,038 0,028** 
Percentage of Protestants -0,084*** -0,083** -0,095*** 0,084*** 0,083** 0,095*** 
Student per Teacher -0,000 -0,000 0,000* 0,000 0,000 -0,000* 
Infant Mortality pc 7,909*** -15,834*** 1,225 -7,909*** 15,834*** -1,225 
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Vaccine pc -0,003 0,012** 0,000 0,003 -0,012** -0,000 
Center -0,026*** 0,018*** -0,008*** 0,026*** -0,018*** 0,008*** 
Left 0,003 0,045*** 0,021*** -0,003 -0,045*** -0,021*** 
Right -0,038*** 0,004 -0,021*** 0,038*** -0,004 0,021*** 
Year=2004 - - 0,030*** - - -0,030*** 
Constant 0,010 -0,890*** -0,015 0,990*** 1,890*** 1,015*** 
Number of Observations 80.437 37.972 118.409 80.437 37.972 118.409 
Adjusted R-Squared 0,069 0,044 0,056 0,069 0,044 0,056 
Main Variables: Average Schooling for individuals with age above 18 years in the municipality; Percentage of Women, Catholics 
and Protestants in the municipality; GDP pc, Infant Mortality pc and Vaccine pc ratios in which the denominator is the population in 
the municipality; Center, Left and Right stand for party’s ideology dummies in which the omitted variable is the Indifferent party 
ideology; North, South, Northeast and Southeast stand for region dummies in the omitted variable is Midwest 
Notes: Results with the standard errors can be found in Appendix D, Table 1B and Table 1B-1 
Source: Sources of the variables used can be found in Appendix B 
***Significant at 1 percent level, **Significant at 5 percent level, *Significant at 10 percent level 
As the results show, controlling for political, cultural, regional and socio-economic 
factors, increases in the proportion of female candidates have a positive impact both on 
the proportion of high-skill and low-skill female candidates. Although the latter effect is 
higher, the impact on the proportion of high-skill female candidates is higher than the 
actual average of the proportion of high-skill female candidates on parties’ list, so that 
the female skill mix improved. Furthermore, increases in the proportion of nominated 
women on parties’ list, reduces the proportion of low-skill male candidates more than 
the proportion of high-skill male candidates.  
Consequently, since the increased proportion of high-skill female candidates is 
higher than the decreased proportion of high-skill male candidates, and because the 
decreased proportion of low-skill male candidates is higher than the increased 
proportion of low-skill female candidates; it follows that increases in the proportion of 
female candidates seems to lead to an increase on the overall quality of the list 
composition. This effect is mostly driven by the increase in high-skill female candidates 
and also the decrease in low-skill male candidates.  
What is more, looking at the results from 2000 to 2004, the allocation of women on 
parties’ list, independent of their quality, is increasing; but for male candidates, the 
reduction on the proportion of high-skill male candidates is higher than the reduction on 
the proportion of low-skill male candidates. Therefore, if high-skill male candidates are 
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decreasing at a faster speed than the low-skill male candidates, it follows that the 
positive impact on total high-skill candidates decreases from 2000 to 2004. 
These results are consistent with those found for the overall data and when 
controlling for region specific effects only (Table 1C in Appendix D). 
FIGURE 1 – Female Candidates' Impact on the Quality of the List Composition 
 
Figure 1 allows a better understanding of the marginal effects of changes in the 
supply of women candidates on the quality of the list composition. Therefore, regarding 
2000 elections, the marginal effect of an increase by 1 percentage points in women 
candidates, would lead to 0,3 percentage points increase of high-skill female candidates 
and to a 0,7 percentage points increase of low-skill female candidates; high-skill male 
candidates would decrease by 0,2 percentage points and the low-skilled would diminish, 
around, 0,83 percentage points. The latter being the ones that suffer the most.  Results 
that are roughly stable across the two elections. 
B. Impact of candidate’s gender on gender and quality composition of electoral results - 
Relative electability 
To study the electorate reaction - regarding gender and quality of elected candidates - 
to female candidates on parties’ lists, the OLS estimator takes the form of: 
 ,  
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where  measures the percentage of high-skill females elected; the percentage of 
low-skill females elected; the percentage of elected females; the percentage of high-skill 
males elected; the percentage of low-skill males elected; the percentage of elected 
males; the percentage of total high-skill elected; the percentage of total low-skill elected 
and the percentage of total elected, on party list , from municipality , at time . The 
rest of the variables are defined in the same way as before. As before the goal is to study 
the effects of increases in female candidates on the quality composition of parties’ list, 
but also to study its effects on the candidates’ electability, therefore the dependent 
variables were constructed in the following manner:  
, the first ratio measures the list composition effects, the second accounts for the type of 
elected politicians over the respective type of candidate of party , in municipality , at 
time   - measuring the electability effects; their product translates into the relative 
electability of the candidates of each party , in municipality , at time .       
The following regressions were estimated with controls, for the overall data and with 
regional controls only, results for this specification can be found in Table 2C and Table 
2C-1 in Appendix D. 
TABLE 2 – OLS REGRESSION RESULTS (3)  








Percentage of Female Candidates 0,055*** 0,049*** 0,052*** 0,081*** 0,087*** 0,084*** 
North 0,000 -0,002 -0,001 -0,002 0,002 -0,000 
South 0,005*** 0,004** 0,004*** -0,002* 0,001 -0,002** 
Northeast 0,004*** 0,004** 0,003*** 0,003*** 0,006*** 0,002*** 
Southeast 0,000 -0,001 -0,001 -0,004*** -0,001 -0,004*** 
GDPpc -0,000* -0,000 -0,000 -0,000*** -0,000* -0,000*** 
District Magnitude -0,000*** 0,000 -0,000*** -0,001*** -0,000 -0,001*** 
Percentage of Women -0,005* -0,118*** -0,007*** 0,001 -0,237*** -0,002 
Average Schooling (F) 0,006** 0,012*** 0,007*** 0,001 0,017*** 0,005** 
Average Schooling (M) -0,005** -0,012*** -0,008*** -0,000*** -0,019*** -0,007*** 
Percentage of Catholics 0,011*** 0,020*** 0,014*** -0,001*** 0,024*** 0,024*** 
Percentage of Protestants -0,005 0,002 -0,002 0,001 -0,010 0,001 
Student per Teacher -0,000*** -0,000** -0,000*** 0,001 -0,000*** -0,000*** 
Infant Mortality pc -0,535 1,549 0,043 -0,002 4,292*** 0,506 
Vaccine pc 0,000 -0,000 -0,000 0,023*** -0,006*** -0,001*** 
Center 0,007*** 0,006*** 0,008*** 0,012*** 0,011*** 0,011*** 
Left -0,002** 0,002** 0,000 0,002*** 0,000 0,001** 
17 
 
Right 0,000 0,005*** 0,002*** 0,008*** 0,006*** 0,007*** 
Year=2004 - - -0,005*** - - -0,002*** 
Constant -0,000 0,037*** -0,001 -0,010** 0,103*** -0,006 
Number of Observations 65.978 35.184 101.162 79.508 38.106 117.614 
Adjusted R-Squared 0,036 0,045 0,039 0,080 0,080 0,079 








Percentage of Female Candidates -0,032*** -0,041*** -0,036*** -0,167*** -0,167*** -0,169*** 
North 0,001 -0,001 0,000 0,049*** -0,006 -0,009*** 
South -0,000 -0,002 -0,000 -0,002*** 0,018*** 0,003 
Northeast 0,008*** 0,003 0,007*** -5,591*** 0,027*** 0,013*** 
Southeast -0,008*** -0,009*** -0,008*** -0,005*** -0,004 -0,016*** 
GDPpc 0,000 -0,000 -0,000 -0,001*** -0,000*** -0,000*** 
District Magnitude 0,000** -0,000** 0,000 -0,006*** -0,001** -0,005*** 
Percentage of Women -0,005 0,188*** -0,003 -0,047*** -1,385*** -0,061*** 
Average Schooling (F) 0,005 0,018** 0,009*** 0,021*** 0,013 0,014** 
Average Schooling (M) 0,002 -0,013* -0,002 -0,001*** -0,018 -0,019*** 
Percentage of Catholics 0,030*** 0,032*** 0,031*** -0,006*** 0,133*** 0,160*** 
Percentage of Protestants -0,015* -0,002 -0,011 -0,047*** -0,046 0,030** 
Student per Teacher -0,000*** -0,000*** -0,000*** 0,021*** -0,003*** -0,002*** 
Infant Mortality pc 2,361** -0,300 1,679* -0,017*** 27,215*** 4,007** 
Vaccine pc -0,003*** -0,006** -0,003*** 0,163*** -0,007 -0,007*** 
Center 0,022*** 0,019*** 0,021*** 0,091*** 0,084*** 0,090*** 
Left 0,011*** 0,011*** 0,011*** 0,016*** 0,014*** 0,016*** 
Right 0,013*** 0,011*** 0,012*** 0,065*** 0,061*** 0,065*** 
Year=2004 - - 0,003*** - - -0,012*** 
Constant -0,011* -0,083*** -0,010* 0,107*** 0,765*** 0,141*** 
Number of Observations 77.222 37.539 114.761 80.437 38.338 118.775 
Adjusted R-Squared 0,021 0,018 0,019 0,153 0,112 0,134 








Percentage of Female Candidates 0,131*** 0,133*** 0,131*** -0,197*** -0,207*** -0,203*** 
North -0,001 0,001 -0,001 -0,010*** -0,007 -0,009*** 
South -0,001 0,004* -0,001 0,003 0,016*** 0,002 
Northeast 0,007*** 0,009*** 0,005*** 0,030*** 0,030*** 0,020*** 
Southeast -0,005*** -0,002 -0,005*** -0,023*** -0,013*** -0,025*** 
GDPpc -0,000*** -0,000 -0,000*** -0,000*** -0,000*** -0,000*** 
District Magnitude -0,001*** -0,000 -0,001*** -0,006*** -0,002*** -0,005*** 
Percentage of Women 0,002 -0,325*** -0,001 -0,052*** -1,173*** -0,063*** 
Average Schooling (F) 0,005** 0,027*** 0,010*** 0,025*** 0,031** 0,022*** 
Average Schooling (M) -0,006** -0,029*** -0,012*** -0,013* -0,031** -0,019*** 
Percentage of Catholics 0,032*** 0,040*** 0,037*** 0,189*** 0,160*** 0,187*** 
Percentage of Protestants 0,002 -0,008 0,002 0,034* -0,051 0,018 
Student per Teacher -0,000*** -0,000*** -0,000*** -0,002*** -0,003*** -0,003*** 
Infant Mortality pc -1,049 5,625*** 0,818 -3,145 26,393*** 5,667*** 
Vaccine pc 0,000 -0,006*** -0,001 -0,008*** -0,012** -0,010*** 
Center 0,017*** 0,016*** 0,017*** 0,111*** 0,102*** 0,109*** 
Left 0,005*** 0,002 0,004*** 0,027*** 0,024*** 0,026*** 
Right 0,012*** 0,010*** 0,012*** 0,078*** 0,071*** 0,077*** 
Year=2004 - - -0,003*** - - -0,009*** 
Constant -0,022*** 0,128*** -0,019*** 0,094*** 0,673*** 0,129*** 
Number of Observations 80.211 38.338 118.549 80.437 38.338 118.775 
Adjusted R-Squared 0,125 0,122 0,122 0,166 0,125 0,148 








Percentage of Female Candidates 0,020*** 0,006** 0,014*** -0,020*** -0,006** -0,014*** 
North 0,001 -0,002 0,000 -0,001 0,002 -0,000 
South -0,000 0,001 0,000 0,000 -0,001 -0,000 
Northeast 0,011*** 0,007** 0,011*** -0,011*** -0,007** -0,011*** 
Southeast -0,009*** -0,010*** -0,009*** 0,009*** 0,010*** 0,009*** 
GDPpc -0,000 -0,000 -0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
District Magnitude 0,000 -0,000* 0,000 -0,000 0,000* -0,000 
Percentage of Women -0,004 0,103* -0,001 0,004 -0,103* 0,001 
Average Schooling (F) 0,007** 0,028*** 0,013*** -0,007** -0,028*** -0,013*** 
Average Schooling (M) 0,000 -0,023*** -0,006* -0,000 0,023*** 0,006* 
Percentage of Catholics 0,037*** 0,048*** 0,041*** -0,037*** -0,048*** -0,041*** 
Percentage of Protestants -0,015 -0,001 -0,010 0,015 0,001 0,010 
Student per Teacher -0,000*** -0,001*** -0,000*** 0,000*** 0,001*** 0,000*** 
Infant Mortality pc 2,095* 0,651 1,876* -2,095* -0,651 -1,876* 
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Vaccine pc -0,003*** -0,005* -0,003*** 0,003*** 0,005* 0,003*** 
Center 0,026*** 0,024*** 0,025*** -0,026*** -0,024*** -0,025*** 
Left 0,014*** 0,013*** 0,013*** -0,014*** -0,013*** -0,013*** 
Right 0,017*** 0,015*** 0,016*** -0,017*** -0,015*** -0,016*** 
Year=2004 - - 0,003*** - - -0,003*** 
Constant -0,025*** -0,059** -0,025*** 1,025*** 1,059*** 1,025*** 
Number of Observations 80.389 37.972 118.361 80.389 37.972 118.361 
Adjusted R-Squared 0,020 0,014 0,017 0,020 0,014 0,017 





   
Percentage of Female Candidates -0,004 -0,010*** -0,007***    
North 0,007** 0,002 0,005**    
South 0,005* 0,010*** 0,004**    
Northeast 0,022*** 0,013*** 0,015***    
Southeast -0,010*** -0,005* -0,010***    
GDPpc -0,000** -0,000** -0,000***    
District Magnitude -0,006*** -0,001*** -0,005***    
Percentage of Women -0,037*** -0,453*** -0,043***    
Average Schooling (F) 0,016*** 0,019** 0,015***    
Average Schooling (M) -0,003 -0,014 -0,005    
Percentage of Catholics 0,122*** 0,076*** 0,108***    
Percentage of Protestants 0,042*** -0,010 0,026**    
Student per Teacher -0,002*** -0,001*** -0,002***    
Infant Mortality pc 8,144*** 14,749*** 8,661***    
Vaccine pc -0,007*** -0,013*** -0,008***    
Center 0,141*** 0,125*** 0,136***    
Left 0,028*** 0,032*** 0,029***    
Right 0,091*** 0,074*** 0,085***    
Year=2004 - - -0,036***    
Constant 0,050*** 0,241*** 0,072***    
Number of Observations 80.437 38.338 118.775    
Adjusted R-Squared 0,163 0,123 0,161    
Main Variables: Average Schooling for individuals with age above 18 years in the municipality; Percentage of Women, Catholics 
and Protestants in the municipality; GDP pc, Infant Mortality pc and Vaccine pc ratios in which the denominator is the population in 
the municipality; Center, Left and Right stand for party’s ideology dummies in which the omitted variable is the Indifferent party 
ideology; North, South, Northeast and Southeast stand for region dummies in the omitted variable is Midwest 
Notes: Results with the standard errors can be found in Appendix D, Table 2B, Table 2B-1 and Table 2B-2 
Source: Sources of the variables used can be found in Appendix B 
***Significant at 1 percent level, **Significant at 5 percent level, *Significant at 10 percent level 
Controlling for political, cultural, regional and socio-economic factors, results show 
that increases in the proportion of female candidates, increases both the proportion of 
high-skill females elected and low-skill females elected, having the highest impact on 
the latter. Therefore, its impact on the proportion of elected females is positive, which 
goes in line with the results in Carmo (2012) and Beaman et al (2009). This impact is 
mostly driven by the increase in low-skill females elected, following the theoretical 
findings of Caselli and Morelli (2001). 
Furthermore, increases in the proportion of female candidates, decreases both the 
proportion of high-skill males elected and low-skill males elected, in which the highest 
reduction is on the latter. Hence, its impact on the proportion of elected males is 
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negative and mostly motivated by the decrease in low-skill males elected, which goes in 
line with the results found by Baltrunaite et al (2012). 
Hence, because the increased proportion of high-skill females elected is higher than 
the decreased proportion of high-skill males elected, and since the decreased proportion 
of low-skill males elected is higher than the decreased proportion of high-skill males 
elected, the impact on the quality of the elected body seems to be positive. This effect is 
driven by the increase in the proportion of high-skill females elected and also the 
reduction in low-skill males elected, a result that is consistent with those found by, 
Baltrunaite et al (2012) and Júlio and Tavares (2010). 
 In addition, looking at the results from 2000 to 2004, there is a slight decrease in the 
proportion of high-skill females elected and an increase in the proportion of low-skill 
females elected. Moreover, regarding the impact on the type of elected males, there is a 
small decrease in the proportion of high-skill males elected, meanwhile the proportion 
of low-skill males elected remains constant. As a consequence, the proportion of total 
high-skill elected from 2000 to 2004, decreases, mostly due to the increase in the 
proportion of low-skill females elected and the decrease in the proportion of high-skill 
males elected.  
These results are consistent with those found controlling for regional factors only 
(Table 2C and Table 2C-1 in Appendix D), for the overall data and follow the same path 
as those described for the candidates’ list composition (Table 1). 
C. Accounting for Endogeneity 
The causality relationship between becoming an elected politician and being a 
candidate raises an endogeneity problem between the independent variable – percentage 
of female candidates – and the dependent variables described previously. Therefore, to 
correct the endogeneity in the percentage of female candidates, the percentage of female 
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candidates in 2000 was used as an instrumental variable for the percentage of female 
candidates in the 2004 elections. The basic intuition is that the decision to be a 
candidate for two consecutive elections is strongly correlated, since from the first to the 
second election, candidates gain experience and become well-known by the voters, 
making being elected easier and causing a higher likelihood of running again for 
election. Moreover, the instrumental variable and the dependent variables will be 
correlated, but only through the indirect path of the percentage of female candidates in 
2000 being correlated with the percentage of female candidates in 2004, which in turn 
determines the dependent variables. With this it can be plausibly assumed that the 
instrument is exogenous. 
Hence, the following equation was estimated:  
, 
where all the variables are defined in the same way as before, but only for the 2004 
elections; and  is the instrumental variable, the percentage of female candidates, on 
party list , from municipality , in 2000. These regressions were also estimated with 
regional controls only, results that can be found in Table 3C in Appendix D. 


















Percentage of Female Candidates 0,078*** 0,127*** 0,197*** -0,080*** -0,297*** -0,371*** 
North -0,001 0,004* 0,003 -0,000 -0,010* -0,010 
South 0,004** 0,002 0,005** -0,002 0,021*** 0,019*** 
Northeast 0,005*** 0,007*** 0,011*** -0,001 0,029*** 0,028*** 
Southeast -0,002 -0,002 -0,004 -0,010*** -0,001 -0,011** 
GDPpc -0,000 -0,000* -0,000* -0,000 -0,000 -0,000 
District Magnitude 0,000 0,000 0,000 -0,001*** -0,001** -0,002*** 
Percentage of Women -0,134*** -0,235*** -0,335*** 0,305*** -1,451*** -1,120*** 
Average Schooling (F) 0,014*** 0,014** 0,026*** 0,019** 0,008 0,027* 
Average Schooling (M) -0,014*** -0,015** -0,026*** -0,013 -0,016 -0,030* 
Percentage of Catholics 0,020*** 0,030*** 0,046*** 0,029** 0,165*** 0,189*** 
Percentage of Protestants -0,002 -0,008 -0,009 -0,014 0,005 -0,011 
Student per Teacher -0,000** -0,000*** -0,000*** -0,000* -0,003*** -0,003*** 
Infant Mortality pc 0,167 4,094** 4,164* -0,514 25,553*** 24,556*** 
Vaccine pc 0,000 -0,004* -0,003 -0,000 -0,007 -0,007 
Center 0,006*** 0,011*** 0,017*** 0,021*** 0,074*** 0,094*** 
Left 0,003* 0,001 0,004* 0,015*** 0,009* 0,024*** 
Right 0,004*** 0,008*** 0,012*** 0,014*** 0,057*** 0,070*** 
Constant 0,038** 0,084*** 0,109*** -0,136*** 0,809*** 0,661*** 
Number of Observations 23.087 24.932 25.070 24.574 25.070 25.070 
Adjusted R-Squared 0,043 0,073 0,114 0,013 0,117 0,122 
Weak Identification Test (F Statistic) 545,869 636,228 643,843 574,24 634,843 628,187 
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Stock-Yogo weak ID test (10% 
maximal IV size) 
16,38 16,38 16,38 16,38 16,38 16,38 
Underidentification Test (P-Value) 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Independent Variables Total High-Skill Elected Total Low-Skill Elected Total Elected  
Percentage of Female Candidates -0,004 0,004 0,001 
North -0,001 0,001 0,002 
South 0,001 -0,001 0,014*** 
Northeast 0,004 -0,004 0,018*** 
Southeast -0,012*** 0,012*** -0,005 
GDPpc -0,000 0,000 -0,000* 
District Magnitude -0,001** 0,001** -0,002*** 
Percentage of Women 0,210*** -0,210*** -0,526*** 
Average Schooling (F) 0,031*** -0,031*** 0,021* 
Average Schooling (M) -0,025** 0,025** -0,015 
Percentage of Catholics 0,044*** -0,044*** 0,104*** 
Percentage of Protestants -0,016 0,016 -0,000 
Student per Teacher -0,000** 0,000** -0,002*** 
Infant Mortality pc -0,849 0,849 18,448*** 
Vaccine pc 0,000 -0,000 -0,012*** 
Center 0,026*** -0,026*** 0,121*** 
Left 0,018*** -0,018*** 0,040*** 
Right 0,017*** -0,017*** 0,082*** 
Constant -0,114*** 1,114*** 0,265*** 
Number of Observations 24.844 24.844 25.070 
Adjusted R-Squared 0,014 0,014 0,108 
Weak Identification Test (F Statistic) 597, 942 597, 942 643, 843 
Stock-Yogo weak ID test (10% 
maximal IV size) 
16,38 16,38 16,38 
Underidentification Test (P-Value) 0,000 0,000 0,000 
Main Variables: Average Schooling for individuals with age above 18 years in the municipality; Percentage of Women, Catholics 
and Protestants in the municipality; GDP pc, Infant Mortality pc and Vaccine pc ratios in which the denominator is the population in 
the municipality; Center, Left and Right stand for party’s ideology dummies in which the omitted variable is the Indifferent party 
ideology; North, South, Northeast and Southeast stand for region dummies in the omitted variable is Midwest 
Notes: Results with the standard errors can be found in Appendix D 
Source: Sources of the variables used can be found in Appendix B, Table 3B 
***Significant at 1 percent level, **Significant at 5 percent level, *Significant at 10 percent level 
The bias level considered, to infer the strength of the instrument is at 10% 
Testing for the power of the instrument, the results show that for all the regressions, 
the instrument in use is strong. Moreover, there is evidence of a well-specified model 
that is adequately identified, and, therefore, further evidence that the instrument is valid.  
Controlling for political, cultural, regional and socio-economic factors, contrary to 
what was observed in the previous OLS results; there is no effect of increases in the 
percentage of female candidates on the quality of the total elected body, or on the total 
elected body itself. Also, the impact of increases in the percentage of female candidates 
on all the other dependent variables is amplified comparing to those found previously.  
The impact of increases in the percentage of female candidates on the percentage of 
low-skill females elected is higher than its impact on the percentage of high-skill 
females elected. Also, increases in the percentage of female candidates leads to a 
reduction on the percentage of low-skill males elected, which is higher than its impact 
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on the reduction on high-skill males elected. Results that are similar to those found for 
the OLS estimation. However, in the instrumental variable estimation, although the 
reduction on the proportion of low-skill males elected is higher than the increased 
proportion of low-skill females elected, the reduction on the high-skill males elected is 
higher than the increased proportion of high-skill females elected.  
These results are consistent with those found controlling for regional factors only 
(Table 3C in Appendix D). 
V. Conclusion 
The effect of the increase on the proportion of female candidates, driven by the quota 
legislation, on the quality of politicians, was investigated. This effect was divided 
between nominated body and elected body. Results show that contrary to what many 
advocate, increasing the presence of female candidates either increases or has no effect 
on the quality of politicians.  Both in the nominated body and the elected body, being 
the effect justified, by the increase on the proportion of high-skill female politicians and 
the reduction on the proportion of low-skill male politicians, under the OLS estimation. 
But when correcting for endogeneity, there is no effect on the quality of the elected 
body. Results that were consistent for the overall data and when controlling for regional 
factors only. Therefore, as this work suggests, the potential sacrifice on the quality of 
the political body should not be an argument against policies that aim to increase 
women representation.  
However, there are still some open questions on the mechanisms through which 
increases in the proportion of female candidates leads to an increase in quality both in 
the nominated and elected body, which can be used for further research. Namely, is the 
quality of the candidates selected by parties in electoral lists what is driving the quality 
of the elected body? Is voters’ preferences? This work does not provide the answer for 
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these questions, since it was only considered female candidates. However, results show 
the same effect mechanism for the overall quality of both nominated and elected body. 
In Brazil, since women outweigh men in all educational levels, the existing gender 
gaps in politics may represent a cost for both society and politics, because there is an 
unexploited potential role for women. Therefore, affirmative action programs that aim 
to increase women representation in politics may represent an effective mechanism that 
brings into the political arena more educated politicians. Hence, as long as it is expected 
that high-skill individuals perform better as politicians, increasing female 
representativeness may be beneficial for the society. Also, the increased contact with 
female politicians, provided by gender quotas, may also reduce voter’ and party’ bias 
and increase their ability to distinguish between good and bad female politicians. Which 
may ultimately, facilitate women’ access into politics, challenging new women to get 
involved in politics, contributing to democratic development.         
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